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Kurdish overrepresentation among Danish 
Islamic State warriors 
 
Mehmet Ümit Necef 
News 
On 10 February 2018 Vedat Sariboga, a 27-year-old Turkish citizen of Kurdish 
origin, was sentenced to five years in jail by a Danish court for having gone to 
Syria to join Islamic State (IS).
1
 In addition, the prosecution demanded his 
expulsion to Turkey and a permanent ban on entry to Denmark. Sariboga’s 
family descends originally from the Kurdish village of Tavsancali in Konya 
province in central Turkey. He has lived since childhood in Vestegnen (the 
Western part of Greater Copenhagen), where many immigrants from Konya 
and their descendants live.  
Summary 
The article discusses the possible reasons why Kurds are apparently 
overrepresented among Danish Islamic State warriors. Research on Turkish 
citizens of Kurdish origin joining IS is also presented, since it also suggests a 
corresponding overrepresentation.   
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Vedat Sariboga is the latest addition to a long list of Kurds stemming from Turkey, Iraq 
or Iran, who have gone to Syria to fight for the Islamic State. Denmark’s Center for 
Terror Analysis (CTA) and the Kurdish journalist Deniz Serinci estimate that the 
number of people who left Denmark for Syria and Iraq since the summer of 2012 to join 
militant Islamist groups is at least 150.
1
 According to Serinci, who is one of Denmark’s 
most prominent investigative journalists working on IS and who has written books and 
articles on the group’s activities in Denmark, 26 of these persons are of Kurdish origin, 
and thus up to every fifth Syria-warrior from Denmark is of Kurdish origin.
2
 He states 
that these numbers suggest an overrepresentation of Kurds in the ranks of Danish IS-
warriors. 
19 of the 26 Danish-Kurdish IS-Kurd warriors stem from the Konya Province in central 
Turkey.
3
 Four of them originate from Kermanshah in Iranian Kurdistan, and at least 3 
from Iraq. Here is a list of the Danish Syria warriors of Kurdish origin. The names of 
the villages or cities they stem from are in parenthesis:
4
  
From Turkey: The sisters Hazal and Leyla Olgun and their elder brother U. O. (Kusca); 
Enes Ciftci (Kusca); Y. K. (Kelhasan) and her husband Ö. K. (Kütükusagi); Ö. K.’s 
cousin S. K. (Kütükusagi); H. Y. (Kelhasan); T. B. Y. (Bulduk); C. O. (Haymana).
5
 
From Iraq: Rawand Taher (Erbil); Yaqoub Ali and Rekan Mahmoud Ali Muhammad 
(Sulaimaniyah); Azad Masoudi and Sardar Masoudi (Ramadi, but the family is 
originally from the town of Sarpol Zahab, Kermanshah, Iran). 
From Kuwait: Mohammad Rostom. 
Three aspects are noteworthy in this list. First, Kusca, Kütükusagi, Kelhasan and 
Bulduk all lie in Konya province and are within a circle with a radius of 15-20 
kilometers. The Kurds of Konya were forced to migrate from Adiyaman province in 
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Southeastern Turkey to Konya in the last decades of the 19th century. At the end of the 
1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s thousands of peasants from these villages 
migrated to Denmark through chain migration. Most of them live in Vestegnen (the 
Western Region of Copenhagen in suburbs such as Ishøj, Brøndby Strand, Høje Tåstrup 
and Albertslund) and have close family relations through intermarriages. There are 
smaller concentrations of Konya Kurds in Danish towns such as Odense, Holsterbro and 
Horsens, but there is no evidence that young Kurds from these areas have joined IS. 
Secondly, journalists and people who work with radicalization have not yet reported any 
Kurd stemming from Konya having gone to Syria to join YPG (The People's Protection 
Units), or any other group to fight against IS. However, Deniz Serinci reported in 2014 
that at least ten Danish Kurds have claimed to have gone to Northern Iraq to fight 
together with the Peshmerga against IS. Two Kurds, one from Iraq and the other from 
Southeast Turkey, are mentioned in the article.
6
 The third noteworthy aspect to the list 
is that the Danish media have only reported about two Danish Turks being involved in 
armed jihadism. The first one, the then 20-year-old Abdülkadir Cesur, was arrested in 
Sarajevo in 2006 and sentenced to thirteen years in prison by a Bosnian court for 
planning a terrorist act in Sarajevo.
7
 The other one is a half-Turkish, half-Pakistani 





Search for reasons 
An earlier investigation published in September 2016 by a group of investigative 
journalists had already suggested the same overrepresentation of Danish Kurds.
 9
 It was 
built on available information on 77 persons of the estimated 138 Danish citizens and 
denizens and the demographic background of these persons. The findings concerning 
the ethnic background showed that the biggest ethnic group was the Kurds with 15 
persons.  
This result was astonishing, since the soldiers of the Kurdish Regional Government in 
Iraq (the Peshmerga) and the PKK-associated Syrian group YPG have been fighting a 
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bloody war against IS in recent years, and the Kurds as such are often seen in the 
Western public opinion as a secular and pro-Western people fighting against IS. 
Since this finding was a cause of wonder, the reasons behind this overrepresentation 
have been the topic of several newspaper articles since the publication of the 
investigation. Jakob Sheikh, who was one of the journalists behind it and the author of a 
book about Danish Syria-warriors, conducted an interview with the Kurdish journalist 
Hetav Rojan, who was at the time the Middle East editor of the Danish political 
magazine Ræson (Reason). Rojan did not question the claim on overrepresentation. 
However, he put forward that the premise itself to categorize the Kurdish Syria-warriors 
under one homogenous label can be imprecise and at worst misleading. He elaborated 
that the Kurds should not be regarded as a collectively acting group of like-minded 
people. He stated that the Kurds as an ethnic group has no monolithic structure, but is in 
practice split up politically, religiously and culturally. 
Some months later, Deniz Serinci and Søren Villemoes investigated the reasons behind 
the alleged Kurdish overrepresentation in a well-researched article
10
 They spoke with 
people working with the issue both in Denmark and in Iraqi Kurdistan. The chairwoman 
of Amal Hayat, an organization working to prevent and identify the reasons behind 
Islamist radicalization, Katina Rasmussen, who has Kurdish roots, told Serinci and 
Villemoes that between 20 and 26 ethnic Kurds have left Denmark for Syria or Iraq to 
join ranks with IS or similar organizations out of a total number of at least 135 persons. 
The journalists add that other sources they have spoken with confirmed this 
overrepresentation. Rasmussen stated also that several Kurdish women have 
disappeared from Denmark since 2013. The journalists furthermore write that according 
to their information at least six Kurdish women have left Denmark to join IS, but they 
only know the identity of three. They add: “Kurds apparently turn up everywhere, when 
you look for Danes with IS relations and sympathies”. 
 
Kuffar, not Kurds 
Serinci has also asked Yasar Olgun, who stems from the Kurdish village of Kusca in the 
Konya province and whose daughters Leyla and Hazal had gone to Syria in May 2016 
to join IS. He reports Olgun as saying that IS in its propaganda goes out of the way to 
underline that they are not against the Kurds. That was the reason why, according to 
him, his daughters were attracted to IS. Yasar Olgun tells Serinci that the IS message is: 
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“We have created an Islamic state, in which we live in an Islamic way. The infidels 
attack us to destroy our state. Our fight is against the infidels. They do not mention 
Kurds, Turks or Arabs”. 
Serinci has also noticed that the IS’ former English language on-line magazine Dabiq 
distinguishes sharply between the Kurds as a Muslim people and “communist” 
organizations such as PKK. According to him, IS in Dabiq does not emphasize 
ethnicity, but the common religion Islam. The killed Kurds from PKK, Peshmerga or 
YPG are not called “Kurds”, but “kuffar” (infidels). This appeals to Kurds who care for 
religion above ethnicity. 
Serinci has also spoken with the psychotherapist Ahmet Demir, who stems from the 
same village as the Olgun family and who has many years of experience working with 
immigrants from Konya. He explains the circumstance that so many IS warriors have 
roots in Konya by pointing to the fact that “Konya has for a long time been the 
stronghold of religious parties. For example, political Islam’s nestor Necmettin Erbakan 
was nominated in Konya”. 
However, according to Demir, it is ultimately not mostly about religion, but more about 
the psychosocial background. He elaborates: “All the Danish Kurdish IS supporters, 
whom I have studied the last three years, had great rupture in the family. One of the 
supporters’ mother, for example, committed suicide, when she was small”. 
Demir thinks that at a time when the youngsters have a superficial knowledge about 
Kurdishness, when they are rootless and vulnerable, have psychological pains due to 
loss of a parent, they meet a person from IS, who employs powerful rhetoric. According 
to him, IS is to all appearances skillful in contacting and luring people to the group. 
If the traumatized youngster blames one of the parents for the psychological pain, 
he/she can punish the parent by going over to IS. It is a huge humiliation for the mother 
or father, who has sympathies for IS’ enemies, that is, for PKK or the Peshmerga. 
 
Iraqi Kurdish IS warriors 
When Serinci and Villemoes present the number of Danish Kurds to Fariq Rashid 
Kestay, the commander of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Sinjar in Northwest Iraq, he 
is not surprised. “We meet the same situation also here. My forces sometimes intercept 
radio messages from IS, where the terrorists speak Kurdish among themselves”.11 The 
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journalists refer to him saying that there is an entirely Kurdish battalion in IS called 
Saladin Ayyubi Battalion. Saladin was the military commander, who expelled Richard 
the Lionheart and crusaders from Jerusalem after the battle of Hattin in 1187. Since he 
was of Kurdish ethnicity, he is perceived as both a Kurdish and Islamic icon.  
Another official from the Iraqi Kurdistan, Mariwan Naqshbandi from the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) told Serinci and 
Villemoes that 500 young Kurds from Iraq joined the ranks of IS between 2013 and 
2014. Furthermore, there were 600 Kurds from Iran and 800 Kurds from Turkey. 
Serinci and Villemoes think that his numbers are probably a conservative estimate, 
since the ministry is only responsible for areas under the control of KRG and not for 
areas with Kurdish groups such as Kirkuk, Sinjar and Khanaqin. They add that there are 
no available statistics on Syrian Kurds who also have joined IS.
12
 
Naqshbandi told the Danish journalists that the number of Kurds in IS has after all 
decreased. His explanation was that the initial aim of the Kurds joining IS was to fight 
against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but then IS ordered them to fight against YPG. 
According to him, IS’s war against the Iraqi Kurdish forces, Peshmerga, and the fact 
that IS executed many of its Kurdish members for treason, are the other reasons why the 
young Kurds were abandoning IS.  
  
Kurdish overrepresentation among Turkish citizens  
In 2014 Günes Murat Tezcür and Sabri Ciftci, respectively the chair of Kurdish Political 
Studies Program at the University of Central Florida and an associate professor in the 
Department of Political Science at Kansas State University, wrote that according to 
recent reports, around 1,000 Turkish citizens have joined IS and several hundred have 
joined Jabhat al Nusra, the al Qaeda branch in Syria.
13
 To get a better sense of these 
fighters, they generated a database with information on about 112 individuals who 
joined the jihadists.  
They found out that “the types of Turks who have been caught up in the jihadist net 
make for unusual recruits”.14 One type of the “unusual recruits” are the Kurds, who are 
overrepresented in the sample. Close to 50 percent of the sample, 51 recruits, are of 
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Kurdish ethnicity. The authors point also to the fact that many Kurds in Turkey traveled 
to Syria also to fight against IS. 
In the article Tezcür and Ciftci present an explanation of IS’ and other similar groups’ 
appeal to some Turkish citizens, but they don’t elaborate on why the Kurds are 
overrepresented.  
Later, Tezcür has expanded his sample by assembling an original sample of 458 Turkish 
citizens who traveled abroad and fought with jihadist groups since the 1980s
15
. Of these 
individuals, 238 fought in Syria since 2012, and the remaining 220 participated in the 
previous wars. Tezcur observes that “(a) disproportionate number of jihadist foreign 
fighters from Turkey are ethnic Kurds”. He states that the sample has the records of 
ethnicity of 326 individuals, 147 of whom – or 44 percent – are Kurds, “well above the 
Kurdish population of Turkey, estimated at 15 to 20 percent”.16 
Tezcür compared also the localities from which the 238 Kurdish jihadis in Syria come 
from. He observes that those who went to fight for YPG come from localities with 
strong networks of Kurdish nationalist mobilization. In contrast, jihadists typically 
come from localities with “dense Islamist networks (i.e., provinces with a history of 
popular informal brotherhoods and formal piety associations) and relatively weaker 
Kurdish nationalist presence”.17 The highest percentage of the 238 jihadis come from 
Konya and Adiyaman with 10 pct. each. Here I would like to draw attention to the fact 
that the Danish Kurds from Konya originally stem from Adiyaman. I cannot here judge 
whether this is coincidental, or if it suggests that certain informal religious brotherhoods 
in Adiyaman continued their presence in Konya after the forced migration at the end of 
the 19th Century. 
 
Conclusions 
The above-mentioned Kurdish journalist Deniz Serinci expresses his astonishment 
about two Danish IS warriors: “I know a Kurdish father in Vestegnen. He stems from 
Konya in Turkey. Although he is a supporter of PKK (Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party), his 
daughter has joined IS in Syria. Last week I was surprised when I found out that a 
Kurdish, probably dead, IS-warrior – also from Vestegnen, and again from Konya – is 
the son-in-law of one of my acquaintances. The latter was a former Peshmerga in the 
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Iraqi Kurdistan.”18: He then puts forward the obvious questions: “How come the 
children of PKK followers and Peshmerga join the IS? Why is every fifth IS-warrior 
from Denmark Kurdish?” 
The explanations presented above probably have a kernel of truth in them. Certain 
Islamic networks and serious family problems possibly play a role. For my part, I think 
one of the main reasons for Kurdish overrepresentation is the ideological, religious and 
political confusion many Kurds live in. In the last decades, the Kurds in Turkey have 
experienced great social changes. Millions of Kurdish peasants have migrated to Europe 
and to industrial cities in Turkey. Thousands were expelled from their villages due to 
armed conflicts between the Turkish army and the PKK guerillas. This led to the fast 
and chaotic urbanization of the Kurds. Kurds ended up being a people who on the one 
hand lived with traditional Islam and with premodern social structures, and on the other 
hand with an armed violent movement, PKK, with strong inspirations from Marxism 
and feminism. In this respect, it is necessary to remember that approximately half of the 
Kurds in Turkey have supported either PKK directly or a PKK-inspired legal party. 
Probably it is this huge social transformation and cultural, religious and political 
conflicts and confusion which is the main reason for the overrepresentation of Kurds 
among IS warriors both in Denmark and Turkey.  
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